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Abstract: With almost $1 billion in funding, Better Place was poised to become one of the most 10 
innovative companies in the electric mobility market.  The system Better Place proposed had two novel 11 
prongs; first, to reduce the cost of batteries, and second, to reduce range anxiety, public infrastructure 12 
concerns, and long charging times.  Yet, despite this seemingly strong combination, Better Place failed to 13 
make any progress in Denmark and Israel, the first two markets it operated in, and subsequently 14 
declared bankruptcy, selling off its collective assets for less than $500,000.  Drawing from science and 15 
teĐhŶologǇ studies aŶd the ŶotioŶ of ͞iŶteƌpƌetiǀe fleǆiďilitǇ,͟ this paper posits several reasons to 16 
explain the failuƌe of Betteƌ PlaĐe, iŶĐludiŶg that DeŶŵaƌk is Ŷot as ͞gƌeeŶ͟ as it seeŵs nor is the Israeli 17 
market as attractive as believed, aŶd that Betteƌ PlaĐe’s solutioŶ to ĐhaƌgiŶg tiŵe and range anxiety 18 
resolved a psychological, not a functional, barrier of the general public to adopt electric vehicles.  Before 19 
investigating these two reasons, the paper presents a short history of Better Place and explores the 20 
ĐoŶtouƌs of its opeƌatioŶs iŶ DeŶŵaƌk aŶd Isƌael.  It theŶ disĐusses ǁhǇ Betteƌ PlaĐe ͞failed͟ aĐƌoss both 21 
countries before concluding with implications for energy planning, policy, and analysis.  22 
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1. Introduction 1 
 Electric vehicles have the potential to provide society with many substantial benefits, including 2 
reduction of carbon emissions, improvement of public health, increasing national security, and savings 3 
on fuel and maintenance cost (Neubauer et al., 2012; Tran et al., 2012).  Despite these benefits, electric 4 
vehicles have yet to be adopted on a large scale (IEA, 2013a) (IEA, 2015).  Specifically in Denmark and 5 
Israel, electric vehicle adoption did not historically move beyond a very niche level.   While Denmark has 6 
had a recent increase in EV sales, total alternative fueled vehicle registration in 2014 was stagnant at 7 
about only 3,000, only representing 0.1% of all vehicles in use in Denmark (ANFAC, 2015). Likewise, 8 
Israel currently has 1,088 electric vehicles, comprising 0.04% of total private registered vehicles (Central 9 
Bureau of Statistics, 2016).  Several extant barriers to electric vehicles in the late 2000s encountered 10 
include higher capital cost, range anxiety, lack of public infrastructure, and long charging time (Lieven et 11 
al., 2011; Parsons et al., 2014; van Bree et al., 2010). 12 
 Seeking to erode these barriers, with almost $1 billion in funding Better Place proposed a novel 13 
system to differentiate the purchase of an electric vehicle with recharging the battery (Chafkin, 2014).  14 
The system Better Place proposed, launched in 2007, had two novel prongs; first, to reduce the cost of 15 
the battery, Better Place would own the battery in the electric vehicle, and consumers would instead 16 
pay for an annual ͞mileage plaŶ͟ ;ŵuĐh like a Đell phone data plan), and second, to reduce range 17 
anxiety, public infrastructure concerns, and long charging time, Better Place constructed a network of 18 
chargers and battery swapping terminals for their consumers to recharge or switch their batteries.  19 
These two prongs would reduce initial capital costs, create a network of public chargers, and with 20 
battery-swapping, reduce charging time to as little as 2 minutes (Naor et al., 2015).  As one magazine 21 
aƌtiĐle put it, ͞Better Place was born to be revolutionary, the epitome of the kind of world-changing 22 
ambition that routinely gets celebrated͟(Chafkin, 2014). 23 
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Thus, in principal, it would appear that Better Place was a well-conceived idea well-poised for 1 
success that entirely removed one of the barriers to electric vehicles, long recharging time, and reduce 2 
many of the other barriers.  Moreover, Better Place, at least as they perceived it, was in one of the 3 
ǁoƌld’s ͞gƌeeŶest͟ ŵaƌkets iŶ DeŶŵaƌk, and piloted in another country, Israel, desperately seeking 4 
energy security.  While Ŷeitheƌ the ͞gƌeeŶŶess͟ of DeŶŵaƌk Ŷoƌ Isƌael’s prioritization of energy security 5 
would make or break the Better Place business model, Better Place viewed each of these countries as 6 
optimal environments that would help encourage electric vehicle adoption. Finally, Better Place had 7 
substantial amounts of funding and important partnerships with major automobile manufacturers, 8 
electric utilities and government departments.  Nonetheless, despite this seemingly strong combination, 9 
Better Place failed to make any progress in Denmark and Israel, and subsequently declared bankruptcy, 10 
eventually selling their $850 million-in assets for only $450,000 in 2013 (Kloosterman, 2013).   11 
This paper posits several reasons to explain the failure of Better Place, drawing from insights in 12 
sĐieŶĐe aŶd teĐhŶologǇ studies that hold that Ŷeǁ ŶiĐhe teĐhŶologies possess ͞iŶteƌpƌetiǀe fleǆiďilitǇ͟ 13 
and can be constrained by heterogeneous technical and social factors.  These include that Denmark is 14 
Ŷot as ͞gƌeeŶ͟ as it seems, Isƌael’s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ of eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ did Ŷot pƌioƌitize deĐƌeasiŶg oil 15 
consumption, and, more generally, that Betteƌ PlaĐe’s solutioŶ to ĐhaƌgiŶg tiŵe and range anxiety 16 
resolved a psychological, not a functional, barrier of the general public to adopt electric vehicles.  Before 17 
investigating these two reasons, the paper presents a short history of Better Place and explores the 18 
contours of its operations in Denmark and Israel.  It then discusses why Better Place ͞failed͟ aĐƌoss ďoth 19 
countries before concluding with implications for energy planning, policy, and analysis.  20 
In embarking on this path, the contribution of the article is manifold.  First, no studies have yet 21 
looked comparatively at Better Place performance across Denmark and Israel, the two markets where it 22 
was most embedded. The energy studies literature on the topic so far is out of date.  Published studies 23 
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only focus on its likely trajectory as a success (Andersen et al., 2009; Budde Christensen et al., 2012; Kley 1 
et al., 2011), something invalidated by history. We explore why.   2 
Second, examining the trials and tribulations of Better Place brings to the forefront discussions 3 
about the profitability and business models surrounding EVs, a topic of high relevance for those looking 4 
at secondary markets for batteries or attempting to eliminate key barriers such as range anxiety (Tyfield 5 
et al., 2015).   A similar model to Better Place is being considered in France with the national electricity 6 
supplier EDF and the automobile manufacturer Toyota, whom are focusing on piloting the expansion of 7 
recharging networks in France and the United Kingdom (Enbysk, 2014).  In these types of models, Better 8 
Place acts as something unique: an aggregator or integrator as well as the provider of infrastructure. To 9 
use an analogy from telephony, they are the AT&T rather than the Apple. Some have even framed 10 
Betteƌ PlaĐe’s ďusiŶess ŵodel as a Ŷeǁ aƌĐhetǇpe kŶoǁŶ as ͞EleĐtƌiĐ ReĐhaƌge Gƌid Opeƌatoƌs͟ or 11 
ERGOs which can become a transformative agent for merging electric mobility with renewable 12 
electricity infrastructure (Andersen et al. 2009).    We test the efficacy of such claims.   13 
Lastly, our comparative case study approach in this instance investigates not a project success, 14 
but a failure—something understudied in the literature due to both the difficulty in collecting data and 15 
the pejorative nature of dealing with unsuccessful projects that often result in bitterness and anger 16 
(Brix, 2015).  Failure is also more common than success, with many possible permutations leading to 17 
failed innovation or adopt but only a contingent synergy of complex factors leading to success.  Braun 18 
even suggests that ͞in analyzing technological development, failed innovations are just as important as, 19 
and possibly eveŶ ŵoƌe so thaŶ, suĐĐessful oŶes͟ (Braun, 1992). 20 
2. Research Methods and Concepts 21 
 Our primary method of data collection for this study was a review of the peer-reviewed 22 
literature on both electric mobility generally and more specifically the contours and operations of Better 23 
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Place.  We searched key academic databases such as Scopus, ScienceDirect, and EBSCO-Host for articles 1 
published in the last ten years (2006-2015).  During these searches, we looked for articles relating to (a) 2 
the social acceptance of electric vehicles, (b) business models for electric mobility, and (c) case studies 3 
of Better Place, of which there were only a handful)  We compiled a few dozen studies though we 4 
reference only the most relevant ones here. 5 
To help filter this voluminous amouŶt of data, ǁe ƌelied oŶ the ĐoŶĐept of ͞ iŶteƌpƌetiǀe fleǆiďilitǇ͟ 6 
from science and technology studies. This literature argues the evolutionary pathway of a novel 7 
technology, such as an electric vehicle or a more refined business approach such as better Place, is not 8 
only a function of its technical qualities and characteristics, but equally so of its perception within society. 9 
In this context, interpretative flexibility is of great importance as it holds that technology emerges in 10 
soĐietǇ as a ͞seaŵless ǁeď͟ (Hughes, 1986) oƌ a ͞soĐioteĐhŶiĐal iŵďƌoglio͟ (Latour, 1999). This concept 11 
of interpretive flexibility emphasizes the mutually constitutive nature of technology, which suggests that 12 
differing interpretations of the same technological device are possible. That is, different social groups see 13 
paƌtiĐulaƌ teĐhŶologies iŶ diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs. These teĐhŶologies, theŶ, ďeĐoŵe ͞heteƌogeŶeous͟ ďeĐause 14 
their meaning, rather than being fixed, is interpreted and negotiated by those social groups connected to 15 
it (Sovacool, 2011). Pinch and Bijker distinguish that technological artifacts possess interpretive flexibility 16 
at two levels: first, in how different social groups conceive of technology; second, that there is no one 17 
possible way that technologies are designed (Pinch and Bijker, 1984). Artifacts are always the product of 18 
inter-group negotiation, and as we will see throughout the article, such negotiation does not always bode 19 
well for the future market acceptance of a technology.  20 
3. History of Better Place 21 
 Better Place was founded by entrepreneur Shai Agassi in 2007 with the aim to imagine a society 22 
that was no longer reliant on fossil fuels.  Better Place imagined that the two barriers to the adoption of 23 
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electric vehicles, and thus the barriers to removing oil from society, were the higher prices of electric 1 
vehicles and the problems associated with recharging the battery.  While electric vehicles had higher 2 
capital costs, lower fuel and maintenance cost made them cost competitive with gasoline vehicles over 3 
time.  Looking to capitalize on longer term economic benefits, Better Place formulated a way to reduce 4 
initial capital costs by monetizing the battery, and recharging thereof, as a service to which customers 5 
would subscribe.  While Better Place would retain the ownership of the battery, its main value was 6 
pƌoǀidiŶg eŶeƌgǇ foƌ ĐoŶsuŵeƌ’s ďatteƌies, eitheƌ thƌough its ĐhaƌgiŶg Ŷetǁoƌk oƌ its ďatteƌǇ sǁappiŶg 7 
stations (Wolfson et al., 2011).   8 
Better Place originally focused on Israel, where they planned a large network of charging and 9 
swapping stations to cover the entire nation by 2012.  This plan included 2.5 charging spots for every car 10 
on the road in Israel, starting with 500,000 charges, in total costing between $50 and $100 million 11 
(Andersen et al., 2009).  At the same time, Better Place did not restrict its operations only to Israel and 12 
soon expanded to Denmark, with plans to expand to Australia, China, and the United States.  Better 13 
Place partnered with Renault, and their joint battery swap-capable car was the Renault Fluence Z.E.1  In 14 
Denmark, the vehicle cost $37,000, plus about $1,500 for their personal home charger (Loveday, 2011).  15 
At the same time, the Fluence Z.E. sold for $35,000 In Israel (Chafkin, 2014). On top of these costs, 16 
dƌiǀeƌs ǁeƌe offeƌed a ͞suďsĐƌiptioŶ͟ plaŶ that alloǁed theŵ to utilize Betteƌ PlaĐe’s ĐhaƌgiŶg 17 
infrastructure, based on the amount of miles driven per year, with prices ranging from $3,300 to $6,700 18 
per year, or $275 to $560 per month (Loveday, 2011).    19 
To give readers a bit more detail, iŶ Taďle ϭ, ǁe Đoŵpaƌe Betteƌ PlaĐe’s Đapital aŶd ŵoŶthlǇ 20 
costs to the costs of the bestselling ICEVs in Denmark (NationMaster, 2014) and Israel (Auto1, 2015) 21 
(OECD, 2013) from 2013 (the Volkswagen Golf (Statistics Denmark, 2015) and the Kia Picanto (Gasnier, 22 
                                                          
1 Thus, the cars were actually sold by Renault and at their dealerships, but they were jointly designed and advertised with Better Place.   
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2014), respectively) based on average driving behavior in each country (Technical University of 1 
Denmark, 2015),(Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015) and 2013 average gasoline prices (OECD, 2014).  2 
While Better Place was a substantially cheaper capital in Denmark, and roughly the same capital cost in 3 
Israel, the monthly cost was markedly higher for the Better Place subscription plans.  While surveys have 4 
found that people are willing to pay thousands of dollars more for an electric vehicle (Larson et al., 5 
2014), (Hidrue et al., 2011), perhaps Better Place was premature due to its costly monthly plan (though 6 
presumably still more than 1,400 consumers would still be interested in the two countries). 7 
[INSERT TABLE 1 about here] 8 
Soon after beginning their operations in these two countries, Better Place began to quickly 9 
expand its plans internationally.  Next came Australia, where the electric utility AGL and the ﬁŶaŶĐe 10 
house Macquarie Bank explored applying the model there with support from the state government of 11 
Victoria (Andersen et al., 2009). Then in the US, the mayors of several Bay Area cities in California 12 
(including San Francisco) signed on, and Haǁaii ďeĐaŵe the ﬁƌst state iŶ the U“ to sigŶ up foƌ stateǁide 13 
coverage in early 2009 (Andersen et al., 2009). 14 
Better Place planned on building the system for electric vehicles before selling the electric 15 
vehicles.  Based on the assumptions that the lack of a charging system was a main barrier to the 16 
adoption of electric vehicles, constructing this large system would have been a costly, but certainly 17 
logical foundation to base their business on.  Moreover, by amortizing the high capital cost of the 18 
electric vehicle to more manageable yearly payments, Better Place appeared to set itself up as a solution 19 
to eleĐtƌiĐ ǀehiĐle iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ’s ďiggest pƌoďleŵs.  Nevertheless, in 2013, Better Place announced 20 
bankruptcy after selling less than 1,000 vehicles in Israel and fewer than 400 vehicles in Denmark.   21 
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4. Why didn’t the Danish support Better Place: Are Danes truly ͞Green͟? 1 
 While Betteƌ PlaĐe’s ŵaiŶ opeƌatioŶ oĐĐuƌƌed iŶ Isƌael, Betteƌ PlaĐe ĐoŶduĐted a suƌǀeǇ aŶd 2 
found that Danish people were the next most likely users to consider purchasing an electric vehicle 3 
(Naor et al., 2015) and began operations there in 2011.  IŶdeed, giǀeŶ DeŶŵaƌk’s ƌeputatioŶ as a leadeƌ 4 
on climate change, one would assume that Danes would be very willing to adopt electric vehicles.  5 
However, this did not happen in the case of Better Place, as only a few hundred vehicles were sold in 6 
total.   7 
 To be sure, there were some legitimate technical and business concerns.  The significantly colder 8 
climate in Denmark meant that lithium ion batteries did not perform as well as in the arid climate of 9 
Israel, something exacerbated by the additional strain that the salting of roads (in the winter) had on the 10 
degradation of battery performance (Younesi, 2013).  While battery degradation is not an 11 
insurmountable barrier, as EV adoption in Norway would show, these concerns may have added to the 12 
perceived barriers to EV adoption in Denmark. These technical problems were coupled with structural 13 
flaws in the business model – as one formal employee stated (quoted in (Chafkin, 2014)): 14 
Everything we needed to go right went wrong.  Every cost on our spreadsheet wound up being 15 
double, every time factor took twice as long.  There was nothing normal about Better Place. 16 
For instance, Better Place's battery-swapping stations, one of them shown in Figure 1, were 17 
projected to cost about $500,000 each; they ended up costing more than $2 million. In addition, there 18 
ǁeƌe pƌoďleŵs ǁith hiƌiŶg, pƌoďleŵs ǁith ŵaƌketiŶg, aŶd liŵited oǀeƌsight ďǇ the ĐoŵpaŶǇ’s ďoaƌd of 19 
directors. 20 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 21 
 Such difficulties became full-fledged crises when they seriously jeopardized the management of 22 
the companǇ.  Although “hai Agassi laďelled hiŵself a ͞seƌial eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌ,͟ he had Ŷo diƌeĐt eǆpeƌieŶĐe 23 
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with automotive manufacturing or electric mobility.  Agassi also hired his little brother Tal Agassi to 1 
manage the battery swapping stations components of BP, despite the fact that he had experience only 2 
in accounting. IŶ this ǁaǇ, BP pƌoŵoteƌs suĐĐuŵďed to a pƌoĐess of ͞seleĐtiǀe ƌeŵeŵďƌaŶĐe͟ ǁheƌe 3 
they ignored or forgot historical data suggesting that BP was neither novel nor the first to propose 4 
battery swapping.  For instance, the Electric Vehicle Company in the United States operated a Battery 5 
Exchange Station on Broadway in New York City for a fleet of electric taxis in 1900 which ran until 1912, 6 
and the battery swapping itself occurred in three to four minutes via a hydraulic stabilizer (Kirsch, 2000).   7 
Furthermore, BP repeatedly misrepresented actual vehicle ownership and operating costs to users.  8 
Agassi reputedly said in meetings and speeches his car would be cheaper than conventional ones or 9 
even free; yet in Denmark, due to higher transportation costs and income taxes for dealerships, a BP car 10 
cost close to $40,000 (excluding the cost of the battery).   A fascination with the BP vision also meant 11 
that BP managers didŶ’t paǇ Đlose eŶough atteŶtioŶ to theiƌ ĐoŶtƌaĐts ǁith supplieƌs ǁhiĐh Đƌeated 12 
more than $100 million in liabilities that started to accrue as delays and technical difficulties occurred.  13 
BP lost $80 million alone with troubles over a billing system software with the firm Amdocs (Chafkin, 14 
2014).   15 
 But these concerns are certainly and strongly complimented by social ones. There is a clear 16 
iŶĐoŶgƌuitǇ ǁith the peƌĐeptioŶ that DaŶes aƌe ͞gƌeeŶ͟ aŶd the laĐk of adoptioŶ of eleĐtƌiĐ ǀehiĐles.  17 
One explanation is that DaŶes aƌe Ŷot as ͞aĐtiǀelǇ͟ gƌeeŶ as one might assume.   To some, Denmark is 18 
ƌeŶoǁŶed the ǁoƌld oǀeƌ foƌ ďeiŶg a ͞gƌeeŶ͟ ĐouŶtƌǇ (Jamison and Baark, 1999), famous for its 19 
emphasis on healthy, active, non-motorized transport (Pucher and Buehler, 2008).    Indeed, 20 
Copenhagen was awarded the European Green Capital Award for 2014 for planning to have 50% of 21 
commuters cycling to their offices in 2015 and to become carbon neutral in 2025 (Business Insights, 22 
2014). 23 
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Yet while Denmark has achieved substantial success in certain aspects of climate change 1 
mitigation, such as decreasing economic carbon intensity, implementing wind energy and combined 2 
heat and power (CHP), while maintaining taxes on fossil fuels and carbon dioxide (Sovacool, 2013), these 3 
actions have required little to no active behavioral changes from the Danish public.  Indeed, a recent 4 
study on Danish environmental attitudes found that very few people knew their price of electricity, and 5 
often overestimated their own knowledge of environmental issues (Sovacool and Blyth, 2015).  The 6 
main accomplishments of Danish climate change mitigation, e.g., energy efficiency and wind energy, 7 
required little to no behavioral change from the average Danish consumer.  On the other hand, 8 
switching their gasoline vehicle would require several different behavior changes, even with Better 9 
PlaĐe’s plaŶs foƌ aŶ eǆteŶsiǀe Đhaƌgeƌ aŶd ďatteƌǇ sǁap Ŷetǁoƌk. 10 
 IŶ spite of DeŶŵaƌk’s ƌeputatioŶ, DaŶish ĐoŶsuŵeƌs seeŵ Ŷo ŵoƌe likelǇ to ďe ǁilliŶg to change 11 
behavior to be more environmental.  IŶdeed, DaŶish ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ŵaǇ ďe ͞passiǀelǇ͟ gƌeeŶ, iŶ that the 12 
main achievements of Denmark are largely invisible to the average Danish consumer.  Given the broad 13 
policy support of wind turbines, and the already high cost of electricity, the transition from coal in the 14 
1990s to the current mix of CHP and wind did not require substantial behavior changes or increases in 15 
energy expenditures from the average Danish consumer.  Compare this to electric vehicles; though fuel 16 
prices are highly taxed, the switch to electric vehicles would require substantial behavior change (e.g., 17 
more planning due to limited driving range, charging overnight or at work), something the average 18 
Danish consumer declined to do, despite their ͞passiǀe͟ gƌeeŶŶess.    19 
 Compounding this issue is that Danish people view themselves as renewable energy leaders, 20 
especially in Europe.  IŶdeed, ŵaŶǇ DaŶes ŵaǇ feel as if theiƌ otheƌ ͞gƌeeŶ͟ aĐtioŶs, suĐh as paǇiŶg a 21 
premium for cleaner electricity, are compensating for their environmental impacts from their vehicles 22 
(Flamm and Agrawal, 2012).  Moreover, surveys have found that Danes are more resistant to changing 23 
their entrenched attitudes and behavior (Sovacool and Blyth, 2015), and also have found waning 24 
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environmental attitudes in Denmark (Sovacool and Tambo, 2016).  Thus not only is Denmark is not 1 
inherently more attuned to being green and adopting electric vehicles, it may be less willing to change 2 
their behavior than neighboring European countries.   Kilbourne et al. (2002) conducted a multinational 3 
survey of energy and environmental attitudes, and concluded that Danish respondents were less 4 
accepting of change, and more set in their values, than every other country studied except for the 5 
United States.  Payne (2013) also suggests that Danish people are also known for being stoic and less 6 
emotional than other European societies, eǀokiŶg theiƌ oǁŶ tǇpe of ͞defeŶsiǀe pessiŵisŵ͟ aŶd 7 
͞Ŷegatiǀe politeŶess Đultuƌe.͟ 8 
 In Denmark, therefore, there is no easy solution to the implementation of electric vehicles, and 9 
perhaps existing incentives remain insufficient.  In contrast to the stagnation of electric vehicles 10 
adoption, Demark has established a successful recipe for mitigating the climate emissions from its 11 
electricity grid.  For example, Denmark accomplished a large scale replacement of coal and oil with CHP 12 
and wind as result of several factors including; consistent, long-term government support of renewables 13 
by way of taxes, R&D and subsidies; polycentric planning that included all stakeholders; and utilizing 14 
learning-by-doing, bottom up focus of implementation (Lund, 2010),(Parajuli, 2012).  In contrast, the 15 
extent of Danish support of electric vehicles includes taxes on gasoline, electric vehicle registration tax 16 
exemption (which expired at the end of 2015), and investment in public charging infrastructure (IEA, 17 
2013b), as  Table 2 documents.  In comparison to DeŶŵaƌk’s ďƌoad poliĐǇ suppoƌt of ǁiŶd, eleĐtƌiĐ 18 
vehicles are correspondingly under-incentivized, as well as requiring more substantial behavioral 19 
change.  If Denmark aims to eliminate the climate change emissions from its transportation system, the 20 
idea was that it should at least replicate the same steps they took to encourage wind energy, in order to 21 
encourage the adoption of electric vehicles. 22 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 23 
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 Of course, incentivizing electric vehicles is quite different than encouraging the development 1 
wind energy, as electric vehicles will require the average Danish consumer to change their behavior.  2 
Indeed, some authors have postulated that the mitigation of climate change may only occur when 3 
changes to the average consumer is incremental and not encroaching on their lifestyle (Naor et al., 4 
2015).  Switching to an electric vehicle requires that Danish consumers usually invest in a higher capital 5 
cost as well as change their behavior, as well as their identity.  To the extent possible, governments 6 
should seek to enact policies that minimize the economic, behavioral, and social differences between 7 
gasoline vehicles and electric vehicles if they wish to reduce the carbon emissions associated with 8 
personal vehicle use.   9 
 In sum, Denmark was not inherently more prone to adopt electric vehicles than any other 10 
country that Better Place could have operated in, in spite of their green reputation.  Sustainable 11 
development of transportation systems requires both personal willingness to change behavior as well as 12 
consistent government support.  Absent both of these factors, market-based solutions like Better Place, 13 
despite their novelty, will face an uphill challenge, in Denmark and beyond. 14 
5. Why didn’t the Israelis support Better Place? Don’t they value energy security? 15 
In addition to Denmark, Better Place originally operated in Israel.  Israel seemed to be an 16 
appropriate location to adopt electric vehicles, given its lack of domestic oil resources and its ongoing 17 
and persistent geopolitical strife with neighboring oil-rich countries.  Not surprisingly, Israel has been 18 
recently concerned with its energy security and pushing for energy self-sufficiency in light of regional 19 
hostility and mistrust (Bahgat, 2014).  In addition to the energy security benefits of electric vehicles, 20 
Israel is also especially prone to the impacts of climate change as a result of its hot, dry climate and 21 
growing concern of water supply (Bahgat, 2014), (Newman, 2009).  Thus, reduction of oil consumption—22 
which leads to significant amounts of water pollution through normal operations, accidents, and 23 
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resulting emissions from tailpipes—would appear to have several clear benefit to Israeli society that 1 
would directly incentivize the development of a self-sufficient, renewable transportation system.  Thus 2 
while Better Place viewed DeŶŵaƌk as aŶ optiŵal ŵaƌket to opeƌate due to theiƌ ͞gƌeeŶŶess͟, Isƌael ǁas 3 
perceived as amenable environment due to their commitment to energy security. 4 
 AddiŶg this to Isƌael’s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ foƌ eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ, Israel also has a rich history of environmental 5 
awareness, with an active and large environmental community, with over a hundred active and legally 6 
register environmental non-governmental organizations (Tal et al., 2013).  Hoǁeǀeƌ, Isƌael’s 7 
environmental community is markedly different than the rest of the Western world, as Israeli 8 
environmental concern does not originate from subjective materialistic values (e.g., level of education 9 
and income), but rather as a response to more of environmental hazard that poses an existential threat 10 
(Drori and Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002).  Oil consumption and climate change appears to constitute a real 11 
thƌeat to Isƌael’s ŶatioŶal seĐuƌitǇ, eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ, aŶd eŶǀiƌonmental quality.  In spite of the security 12 
threat and historical environmental awareness, Isƌael’s Đliŵate ĐhaŶge aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal tƌeŶd iŶ 13 
recent years has been largely negative, and per capita greenhouse gas emissions, already higher than 14 
most European standards, are expected to double over the next 15 years (Tal et al., 2013).  Thus, despite 15 
an active environmental community and citizen awareness of general environmental issues, as well as 16 
Isƌael’s pƌioƌitizatioŶ of eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ, very little direct action has been taken to mitigate greenhouse 17 
gas emissions. 18 
 Essentially, Isƌael’s seĐuƌitizatioŶ of eŶeƌgǇ stands as separate and arguably more important 19 
than environmental concerns.  Israel has long prioritized the security of its fuel supply, regardless of if it 20 
was fossil fuel based or renewable.  Because Isƌael’s eŶeƌgǇ sǇsteŵ is alŵost eŶtiƌelǇ disĐoŶŶeĐted fƌoŵ 21 
its ŶeighďoƌiŶg ĐouŶtƌies, it is ĐoŶsideƌed aŶ ͞eŶeƌgǇ islaŶd͟ (Bahgat, 2008), (Fischhendler, 2015).  After 22 
the Yom Kippur War and the oil crises in 1970s and 1980s, Israel imported coal its primary fuel source 23 
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for electricity (Teschner and Paavola, 2013), and began importing oil from various non-Arab regions, 1 
including Russia, the Caspian Sea and Africa (Bahgat, 2014), (Fischhendler and Nathan, 2014).   2 
This growing dependence has had three somewhat negative implications for Better Place.  First, 3 
because an isolated electricity grid is more difficult to maintain reliably, as documented by rolling 4 
ďlaĐkouts iŶ the eaƌlǇ ϮϬϬϬ’s ;ĐostiŶg the Isƌaeli eĐoŶoŵǇ huŶdƌeds of ŵillioŶs of dollaƌsͿ (Fischhendler, 5 
2015), there has been more of a focus to develop and diversify reliable fuel supplies for electricity, not 6 
transport. This essentially minimizes the importance of oil dependence for Israeli, at least vis-à-vis 7 
electricity.   Foƌ eǆaŵple, the oŶe ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ Isƌael’s eŶeƌgǇ sǇsteŵ had ǁith a ŶeighďoƌiŶg ĐouŶtƌǇ ǁas 8 
a natural gas pipeline with Egypt, where Israel agreed to purchase 60 billion cubic feet (bcf) per year of 9 
natural gas from Egypt.  However, the pipeline has been attacked a dozen times by terrorists and since 10 
been suspended by Egyptian authorities (Bahgat, 2014), aŶd is uŶlikelǇ to ĐoŶtiŶue, ŵakiŶg Isƌael’s 11 
electricity grid more vulnerable (Siddig and Grethe, 2014), (Bahgat, 2014).   As such, energy policy in 12 
Israel has focused largely on the electricity grid rather than transport, even though the policies set in 13 
place to develop a more robust electric grid would also have developed an electric grid readily capable 14 
of cheaply charging EVs (Teschner and Paavola, 2013).  In 2010, the Israeli government passed a climate 15 
change bill (the National GHG Emissions Reduction Act), focusing on reducing electricity consumption by 16 
promoting energy efficiency, development of solar energy and the development of natural gas, but was 17 
critiqued by the environmental community for failing to take a system-wide approach (such as 18 
implementation of a carbon tax) (Michaels and Tal, 2015).   19 
In stark contrast, there has been little discussion or policy regarding the energy security of oil 20 
and the electrification of transportation in Israel.  As shown in Table 2 above, the extent of policies 21 
encouraging EV adoption in Israel is largely an exemption from taxes.  Likewise, because Israel largely 22 
imports it oil from distant countries (Bahgat, 2008), the fuel supply and consumption of oil continues to 23 
ďe disĐoŶŶeĐted fƌoŵ Isƌael’s pƌioƌitizatioŶ of eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ.  A disƌuptioŶ of oŶe Isƌael’s oil suppliers 24 
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would entail switching importers and potentially increasing gasoline prices, while a disruption in natural 1 
gas supply could potentially cause economically devastating blackouts (Michaels and Tal, 2 
2015)(Teschner and Paavola, 2013).   3 
Second, such dependence has convinced Israel to focus on natural gas as a preferred fuel source 4 
for power and vehicles, cannibalizing the market potential for electric mobility.  Around the same time 5 
as its pipeline was getting attacked, Israel discovered one of the largest offshore natural gas deposits in 6 
the world, aptly named Leviathan, estimated at a size of 16,000 trillion cubic feet (tcf), vastly 7 
outǁeighiŶg Isƌael’s aŶŶual use of Ϭ.Ϯϰ tĐf/Ǉeaƌ (Bahgat, 2014).  Isƌael’s eleĐtƌiĐitǇ gƌid ƌeŵaiŶs 8 
(according to some) ͞oŶ the ǀeƌge of a Đƌisis͟ (Teschner and Paavola, 2013), and the development of 9 
domestic offshore natural gas would have substantial economic implications, increasing the welfare of 10 
Israelis by $300-$400 million (Siddig and Grethe, 2014).  Thus, energy policy discussions have frequently 11 
centered on the importance of developing and diversifying to natural gas, not electric mobility 12 
(Fischhendler and Nathan, 2014).  Similarly, the development of solar electricity facilities in the Negev 13 
Desert has likewise been discussed in the context of energy security and independence (Fischhendler, 14 
2015).    15 
Third, and further hurting markets for EVs, Israel has enacted some of the most beneficial 16 
policies and incentives for the development of fossil fuels, and somewhat marginalized environmental 17 
concerns such as climate change (Bahgat, 2014).  Israelis think of climate change as a quality of life issue 18 
and therefore put other elements of national security first (Michaels and Tal, 2015), rather viewing 19 
climate change as a real, present, environmental hazard that Driori & Yuchtman-Yaar (2002) postulated 20 
led to greater environmental awareness among Israelis.   And worse yet, even when environmental 21 
issues are visible to the Israeli, studies have shown that Israeli citizens tend to blame largely government 22 
aŶd iŶdustƌǇ, alŵost ŶoŶe ďlaŵe ĐitizeŶs.  Foƌ eǆaŵple, a suƌǀeǇ ĐoŶduĐted iŶ Isƌael’s thƌee laƌgest Đities 23 
found that around 80% to 90% of the blame regarding air pollution should be the central or local 24 
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government, with less than 2% of the blame associated with private citizens (Drori and Yuchtman-Yaar 1 
2002).  Absent significant and substantial government support for electric vehicles, it is unlikely that 2 
citizens will adopt electric vehicles out of their own impetus for purely environmental reasons.  3 
Confusingly, Israelis and their institutions are well aware of many of the ecological problems in their 4 
country, often acknowledge their severity, but fail to take any action to prevent environmental 5 
degƌadatioŶ, shoǁiŶg sigŶs of ͞eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal sĐhizophƌeŶia͟ (Newman, 2009).    6 
The average Israeli may not ͞ĐoŶŶeĐt the dots͟ to the energy security implications and 7 
environmental impacts of their transportation and oil consumption.  Thus, similar to how Danes are 8 
͞passiǀelǇ͟ gƌeeŶ, ǁe pƌopose that Isƌaelis aƌe ͞passiǀelǇ͟ eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌe.  Like DeŶŵaƌk’s pƌioƌitizatioŶ 9 
of gƌeeŶ eŶeƌgǇ, Isƌael’s pƌioƌitizatioŶ of eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌitǇ has laƌgelǇ ďeeŶ doŶe ǁithout the aĐtiǀe 10 
participation of Israeli citizens – rather it has been done at a national scale.   While natural gas and solar 11 
development do not require action of average Israelis, the adoption of electric vehicles requires 12 
personal investment and behavioral change.   Without the support of policy or the securitization of 13 
transportation (Michaels and Tal, 2015), Better Place also faced an uphill battle with the Israeli public.  14 
Finally, a large portion of the Israeli vehicle fleet, especially newly purchased vehicles, are purchased by 15 
employers and offered as employment benefits (Frenkel, Bendit, and Kaplan 2014).  Indeed, a significant 16 
subsection of the Israeli population does not pay for their car or its fuel (Bahgat, 2014), further removing 17 
the ĐoŶsuŵeƌ fƌoŵ ďeiŶg ͞aĐtiǀelǇ͟ eŶeƌgǇ seĐuƌe.  Thus, the average Israeli citizen, assuming that they 18 
were not provided a company car already, may not have viewed Better Place in the context of energy 19 
security nor have been willing to pay for its environmental benefits. 20 
  In sum, Israel is indeed very concerned about energy security, however it is mostly associated 21 
with developing their own supplies of fossil fuels, and little was done to actually encourage more 22 
sustainable transport.  While Israelis were thought to be more cognizant of environmental issues, these 23 
are not defined in terms of national security (Newman, 2009), and often take the backseat to more 24 
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traditionally focused energy security issues such as import dependence or security of supply.  At the 1 
same time, the environmental community in Israel has not made great strides in proactive climate 2 
change mitigation policies, but rather focus on responding to environmental hazards – essentially 3 
dealing with the symptoms, not the roots, of environmental problems (Tal et al., 2013).  While it was 4 
expected that Israel would define climate change and oil consumption in terms of national security, this 5 
argument never truly gained traction, and led to a lack of government support of renewable energy 6 
systems (Michaels and Tal 2015), as well as indifference from the Israeli public.  As a result of Israel 7 
decoupling oil consumption from matters of national security, the argument for the adoption of EVs was 8 
solely environmental, and still required substantial behavioral change from the average Israeli.  Absent 9 
consistent and substantial policy support, Better Place, despite its potential, geopolitical, energy security 10 
and environmental benefits to Israel, competed in a market that was not inherently more supportive of 11 
electric vehicles than any other country.  12 
6. Why Didn’t Better Place Overcome Range Anxiety?  13 
The fact that Denmark and Israel may have not been special environments for electric vehicles 14 
to flourish may not explain the failure of Better Place in these two countries by itself. Moreover, Better 15 
Place also failed to make a substantial mark in other parts of the world, despite their seemingly solid 16 
business model.  From a purely electric vehicle perspective (ignoring variances in environmental 17 
perspectives from country to country), this paper contends that the main barriers that Better Place 18 
attempted to resolve, long charging time and range anxiety, may not be the most salient barriers to 19 
electric vehicle adoption.   20 
From a purely technical perspective, the range of most electric vehicles is already more than 21 
sufficient for the vast majority of trips taken by personal vehicles (and it has been for many years).   For 22 
example, in California, Zhang et al (2015) found that the average vehicle traveled only 7.8 miles per trip, 23 
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and 31.8 miles per day.   Moreover, with installing only 290 charging stations in the entire state, the 1 
authors found that 98% of vehicles could feasibly be converted to electric vehicles.  If people were 2 
ǁilliŶg to alteƌ theiƌ dƌiǀiŶg ďehaǀioƌ foƌ Ŷo ŵoƌe thaŶ ϭϬ daǇs a Ǉeaƌ, theŶ ǁell oǀeƌ ϵϱ% of people’s 3 
driving needs could be met by an electric vehicle with a range of only 100 miles (Pearre et al., 2011).   4 
Likewise, even after substantial wear on the battery, such as 20% loss of battery capacity, 85% of daily 5 
tƌaǀel Ŷeeds ĐaŶ still ďe ŵet, iŵplǇiŶg ͞that ƌaŶge aŶǆietǇ ŵaǇ ďe aŶ oǀeƌ-stated ĐoŶĐeƌŶ͟ (Saxena et 6 
al., 2015).    7 
In spite of this, however, it has long been established the average consumer views range anxiety 8 
and charging time as a major barrier to the adoption of electric vehicles.  However, of the several factors 9 
that form range anxiety, such as battery size, charging infrastructure, and charging time, most surveys 10 
have shown that reducing charging time is the least of these barriers.   For example, Hidrue et al. (2011) 11 
found that people are willing to pay 44% more to extend the range of an electric vehicle from 150 miles 12 
to 200 miles than to decrease the charging time from 1 hour to 10 minutes.  Perhaps the average 13 
consumer is willing to stop for longer if this implies that they would have to stop less often.  The 14 
difference in additional willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reducing charging time from 1 hour to ten minutes 15 
is roughly similar to the additional WTP for increasing the performance of the electric vehicle from 5% 16 
slower than a gasoline vehicle to 5% faster (Hidrue et al., 2011).   17 
Likewise, a study in South Korea found that consumers were willing to pay $2,500 as a lump sum 18 
to increase the accessibility of chargers from just ordinary locations to specialized locations, such as at 19 
gas stations (Hong et al., 2012). On an annual basis, Hong et al. (2012) noted that South Korean 20 
consumers were only willing to pay $1,250 per year for the ability to swap batteries, and $751 a year to 21 
be guaranteed access to chargers in all locations.  Adding these numbers together, about $2,000 per 22 
Ǉeaƌ, is still sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ less thaŶ aŶǇ of Betteƌ PlaĐe’s aŶŶual suďsĐƌiptioŶ plaŶs, which were 50% to 23 
300% more expensive than this WTP (Loveday, 2011).  Therefore, while the average consumer is willing 24 
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to pay more to make charging more convenient and accessible, it is not clear that the creation of a quick 1 
and large network of chargers and battery swapping stations would erode a major barrier to the 2 
adoption of electric vehicles, nor would it be cost effective.   3 
 In light of the above, the question remains why range anxiety persists as a barrier to adoption of 4 
electric vehicles.  Some studies have found that driving range was no longer considered a problem after 5 
drivers experienced electric vehicles (Ryghaug and Toftaker, 2014),(Rauh et al., 2014).   Range anxiety 6 
could be borne largely out of their ignorance of daily driving practices compared to an electric vehicle’s 7 
technical capabilities.  At the same time, other studies found that after experiencing electric vehicles, 8 
range anxiety continued to be a critical factor for drivers, in some cases increasing (Jensen et al., 2013), 9 
(Krause et al., 2013).  Thus, confusingly, range anxiety has been found to both decrease and increase 10 
after an individual experiences driving of an electric vehicle.    11 
 Perhaps range anxiety, and the correlated need for public charging infrastructure, is not 12 
dependent on the technical aspects of the electric vehicle or the charging system, but rather entirely 13 
dependent on individual characteristics (Rauh et al., 2014).   Essentially, those who have characteristics 14 
more attuned to driving an electric vehicle will view range anxiety is a limited barrier, whereas those 15 
who reject electric vehicles will view range anxiety as a major barrier, even after driving an electric 16 
vehicle.  We concur with Kirsch (2000: 24-25), who astutely noted more than a decade ago that: 17 
BlaŵiŶg the ďatteƌǇ does Ŷot pƌoǀide a full eǆplaŶatioŶ … the shoƌthaŶd deteƌŵiŶisŵ eǆpliĐit iŶ 18 
the blame-the-battery explanation continues to cloud present debates about the future role of 19 
alternatives to internal combustion. 20 
If, for instance, energy density and other salient technical properties govern technological preferences 21 
alone, we would all drive uranium fueled, fission-powered cars.  Thus, the solution to range anxiety may 22 
not be construction of an expansive and expensive charging and battery swapping network, but rather 23 
investigating the individual characteristics that determine general willingness to buy an electric vehicle.   24 
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Indeed, because changing behavior, expectations and attitudes regarding electric vehicles may 1 
be untenable (Flamm and Agrawal, 2012), the best solution to range anxiety may be drastically 2 
increasing performance of batteries and chargers such their designs minimize alterations to lifestyle and 3 
behavior in comparison to the traditional vehicle (Sovacool and Hirsh, 2009). Nonetheless, until that 4 
point, range anxiety may continue to be a post-hoc excuse for consumers to reject electric vehicles in 5 
order to avoid changing their behavior or desires.  However, the structure of Better Place as a company 6 
was designed specifically to reduce range anxiety and make recharging an electric vehicle more like a 7 
traditional gasoline vehicle, yet still failed.  Examining the failure of Better Place, as well as the existing 8 
literature, this paper proposes that range anxiety may only be the surface of a much deeper, more 9 
complex problem regarding identity and electric vehicles.   10 
7. The Future of Battery Swapping: Will there be another Better Place? 11 
 Though Better Place failed due to a mix of overstretch, overinvestment in battery swapping 12 
technology, general mismanagement, and a misunderstanding of its first two core markets, there are 13 
several reasons that battery swapping may still be in the future of electric vehicles.  Tesla has recently 14 
investigated battery swapping technology (but putting off large-scale development until interest 15 
develops)(Korosec, 2015), and battery swapping remains the only way to recharge an EV to a similar 16 
rates to traditional gasoline vehicles.  One major driver that may lead to the future development of 17 
battery swapping stations is the drastic historical and projected future decreases to battery costs (DOE, 18 
2014).  Since Better Place was in operation, battery prices per kWh capacity have dropped by about half, 19 
and are projected to drop by another half in the coming years.  This would have greatly reduced the cost 20 
of having extra batteries stored in the swapping station network.  At the same time, the development of 21 
vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology could have also presented another use for the batteries in the 22 
swapping stations (Battistelli and Conejo, 2014).  Both of these would have reduced the operational cost 23 
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of the charging and battery swapping network, and this financial stability may have allowed Better Place 1 
more time to get Israelis and Danes to adopt EVs. 2 
 On the other hand, there are several reasons that battery swapping may already be obsolete.  3 
Because batteries are becoming cheaper, combined with future technology developments increasing 4 
capacity (DOE, 2014), the future electric vehicle will likely have a range of 200 to 300 miles , greatly 5 
reducing the times where charging outside of the home or work is even necessary (Zhang et al., 2015).  6 
Second, the average charger will continue to increase in capacity, becoming more efficient and has 7 
become less costly, thereby reducing recharging time, and decreasing the marginal benefits of battery 8 
swapping (Yilmaz and Krein, 2013) (Burger and Reichert, 2011) (Korosec, 2015).  Finally, large-scale 9 
implementation of battery swapping would likely require standardization across car manufacturers, but 10 
car companies would have limited incentive to all agree to a single standard (Budde Christensen et al., 11 
2012).  Thus, the future of battery swapping is at a critical juncture, where it could become obsolete or 12 
relegated to a niche role in the EV infrastructure system.   13 
8. Conclusion and Policy Implications 14 
 In sum, Better Place presented a novel idea to reduce range anxiety and the high capital cost of 15 
electric vehicles, and operated in one of the most widely-peƌĐeiǀed ͞gƌeeŶ͟ societies in the world 16 
(Denmark) alongside one where energy security is perceived to be of paramount concern (Israel).  17 
Nonetheless, Better Place operated from only 2007 to 2013, failing to sell more than 400 vehicles in 18 
Denmark and 900 vehicles in Israel.  This paper finds that this failure can be explained by a confluence of 19 
social, technical, political, and environmental factors that precipitated the demise of BP.  These factors 20 
cut across environmental attitudes and resistance to change among users, mismanagement and 21 
strategic blunders involving corporate strategy, and higher than expected capital costs for vehicles.  In 22 
addition, the faĐt that DaŶish soĐietǇ is oŶlǇ ͞passiǀelǇ͟ greener than other societies, and because 23 
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electric vehicles require active changes to behavior or lifestyle, electric vehicle implementation in 1 
Denmark was still an uphill challenge.  In Israel, general government and citizen environmental 2 
awareness did not translate to interest in electric vehicle adoption because this was not viewed as either 3 
an essential energy or national security issue.  These all Đƌeated a ͞seaŵless ǁeď͟ of soĐioteĐhŶiĐal 4 
ĐoŶstƌaiŶts oŶ BP’s aďilitǇ to suĐĐessfullǇ ŵeet its ŵissioŶ and promote its rather innovative business 5 
model, leaǀiŶg theiƌ ǀehiĐles aŶd ĐhaƌgiŶg statioŶs opeŶ to ͞iŶteƌpƌetiǀe fleǆiďilitǇ͟ ǁheƌe ŵaŶǇ 6 
potential adopters simply rejected the technology.   7 
Moreover, this paper supposes that range anxiety may not be a functional barrier to electric 8 
vehicle adoption, and may instead be an excuse given by consumers to refrain from changing their 9 
behavior, identity and desires regarding ownership of a vehicle.  We must, as Kirsch has noted, reject 10 
the deteƌŵiŶisŵ iŶheƌeŶt iŶ the ͞ďlaŵe the ďatteƌǇ͟ eǆplaŶatioŶ foƌ failuƌe.  Future developers of 11 
electric vehicles and its systems should be cognizant of the potentially deeper connotations of range 12 
aŶǆietǇ peƌtaiŶiŶg to ĐoŶsuŵeƌ’s peƌsoŶalities aŶd the ƌeƋuiƌed goǀeƌŶŵeŶtal, soĐietal, aŶd peƌsoŶal 13 
support required for successful implementation of electric vehicles.    14 
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